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State Law Responses to Global Warming:
Is It Constitutional to Think Globally
and Act Locally?
DAVID

R.

HODAS*

Over the past few years, the public policy news in America on
global warming has generally fallen into two categories. Either
the reports relate Bush Administration opposition to all international and national legal action addressing global warming, or the
reports relate that yet another state or local government is adopting new laws or regulations to reduce or mitigate greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. It is as though we live in two different countries. At the federal level, all policy makers oppose all efforts to
control GHG emissions-from the Bush Administration's rejection
of the Kyoto Protocol, to policies as subtle as the recent U.S. Department of Energy rule proposal that quietly removed language
about tracking potential future credits industry might be entitled
to for their voluntary, private GHG reduction projects.1 Thus, despite occasional public protestations that it favors voluntary actions, the Bush Administration's actions send the message that
the federal government will let all good climate change deeds be
punished, for otherwise the public verification of private sector
voluntary actions might give the private sector a stake in promot2
ing a global warming legal regime.
In contrast, policy initiatives at the state level generally 3 take
the opposite approach, encouraging GHG mitigation actions,
*

Professor, Widener University School of Law, LL.M. in Environmental Law

(Feldshuh Fellow) 1989, Pace University School of Law; J.D., cum laude, 1976, Boston
University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 1973, Williams College.
1. U.S. Dep't of Energy, General Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,204 (proposed Dec. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt.

300).
2. Comment of Marlo Lewis, Jr. on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute to the United States Department of Energy 1-2 (June 5, 2002), available at
https://ostiweb.osti.gov/pighg/attachments/lewis.pdf. "A crediting program would energize the 'greenhouse lobby'-the coalition of politicians, advocacy groups and companies supporting the Kyoto Protocol and kindred energy restraining policies." Id.
3. Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, West Virginia, Wyoming, and Oklahoma are exceptions to the trend. See ALA. CODE § 22-28A-3 (2003). This section states:
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whether big or small, at every turn.4 Beginning over a decade ago,
there has been a steady drumbeat of announcements of state and
local initiatives to mitigate global warming from the emission of
greenhouse gases (GHG). 5 There are various motivations for
these developments, but it is fair to say that in one way or another, each initiative has been motivated by a combination of
worry about the economic and environmental risks of global
warming and future regulations of GHG emissions. 6 These state
initiatives promote policy innovation, provide implementation experience and learning, 7 promote diversity of approaches, and "provide a forum for moving forward on climate change mitigation
,,8 These activthat is largely unavailable at the national level ....
ities are part of a long history of "bold experiment [ation] in cooperative federalism"9 so central to environmental law, and especially
air pollution law, in the United States. 10 Some form of cooperative
federalism will be necessary for an effective GHG policy because
the U.S.'s variety of GHG emitters and sinks is so numerous and
Effective immediately, the Director of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management shall refrain from proposing or promulgating
any new regulations intended in whole or in part to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases, as such gases are defined by the Kyoto Protocol, from
the residential, commercial, industrial, electric utility, or transportation
sectors unless such reductions are required under existing statutes.
Id.; see also 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/15 (2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.20-125
(Michie 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A. § 1-1-207 (2003); W. VA. CODE § 22-23-1 (2003);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-213 (Michie 2003).
4. See Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think
Locally, Act Globally, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 46 (Winter 2004).
5. See, e.g., John Dernbach & The Widener University Law School Seminar on
Global Warming, Moving the Climate ChangeDebate From Models to ProposedLegislation: Lessons From State Experience, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,933 (2000).
6. David R. Hodas, Using Environmental Externalities to Regulate the Risk of
Harm from Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in

SOCIAL COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

488 (0.

Hohmeyer et al. eds., 1997).
7. See, e.g., Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, The Impact of Learning-ByDoing on the Timing and Costs of CO 2 Abatement, Working Paper 02-8, AEI-Brook-

ings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (May 2002), available at http://www.aei.
brookings.org/publications/index.php?tab=topics&topicid=22#a2002. Learning-by-doing, "the process by which the costs of new technologies decline as a function of cumulative experience" may not significantly change when shifting to a less carbon
intensive economy, it can dramatically reduce (by between $2 and $3 trillion) the
costs of reducing GHG emissions. Id. at 1, 10, 17 figure 6.
8. See Dernbach, supra note 5, at 10,949.
9. Connecticut v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
10. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 101 (4th ed. 2003).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol21/iss1/4

2

2003]

RESPONSES TO GLOBAL WARMING

varied that any purely national-level response will have minimal
11
chances for success.
In the past two years, as states have become frustrated with
the failure of the Bush Administration to develop national and international global warming mitigation policies, and with President George W. Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, that
drumbeat from the states has become louder and more insistent. 12
For example, Governor Pataki of New York and the governors of
nine other states in the northeast recently agreed "to develop a
flexible, multi-state cap and trade... program from power plants
...[that would be] the first multi-state greenhouse gas control
program in the United States."1 3 Maine passed a law in late June
2003 that requires Maine to reduce carbon dioxide (C0 2) emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, and then to 90% of 1990 levels by
2020; Maine's "long-term object is to cut emissions by as much as
80%." 14 "Three Western States Announce Plan to Slash GHG
Emissions" was the September 23, 2003 headline for the article
describing the plan between Washington, Oregon, and California
to reduce transportation sector GHG emissions, to provide renewable energy and energy efficiency standards, and to "coordinate
their GHG emissions inventories." 15 In May 2003, "six Northeast
States announced a voluntary greenhouse gas registry."1 6 Regionally, the governors of New England states and the premiers of the
provinces in eastern Canada (in total, eleven jurisdictions are involved) are collaborating to develop a regional approach to the reduction of GHGs. 1 7 In July 2002, California enacted Assembly
11. See Dernbach, supra note 5, at 10,942.
12. See Richard Blumenthal & Kimberly Massicotte, Seven States Notify EPA of
Their Intent to Sue Over Global Warming, 2003 ABA SEC. OF ENV'T, ENERGY & RES. 25, available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/climatechange/newsletter/
june03/globalwarming.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
13. Press Release, Center for Clean Air Policy, The Center for Clean Air Policy
Applauds Governor Pataki and Northeastern Governors [sic] Decision to Develop A
Regional Cap and Trade Program for Carbon Emissions from Electric Utilities (July
25, 2003), available at http://www.ccap.org/pdf/2003-July-25-CCAP-ApplaudsNE
Govson_C02_Initiative-PressRelease.pdf.
14. Allison A. Freeman, Maine Passes Law to Curb GHG Emissions, GREENWIRE,
June 30, 2003, at http://www.eenews.netGreenwire/Backissues/063003/06300307.
htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
15. Brian Stempeck, Three Western States Announce Plan to Slash GHG Emissions, GREENWIRE, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/Backissues/
092303/092303.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
16. Id.
17. See Ken Colburn & Amy Royden, New England States and Eastern Canadian
Provinces Team Up to Tackle Climate Change, 2003 ABA SEC. ENV'T, ENERGY & RES.
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Bill 1493 to "require the [State Air Resources Board] to develop
and adopt, by January 1, 2005, regulations that achieve the maximum feasible reduction of greenhouse gases emitted by passenger
vehicles and light-duty trucks"'8 which would go into effect for
2009 model-year vehicles. 19
States have also been actively pressing the federal government to address global warming. In 2002, the Attorneys General
of eleven States (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) asked President Bush to reconsider his voluntary climate
policies and to move instead toward "a 'strong national approach'
to the 'most pressing environmental challenge of the 21st century."' 20 The Administration did not change its policy. These
states also petitioned the EPA to list carbon dioxide (C0 2) as a
criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act. 2 1 However, in the
summer of 2003, EPA denied the various petitions to list carbon
dioxide as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. These states, with
others, are now seeking judicial review of the denial. 22 These
state legislative, policy, and litigation initiatives are but the tip of
the iceberg of state and local legal proposals to reduce GHG
23
emissions.
7, available at http://abanet.org/environ/committees/climatechange/newsletter/june
03/newengland/home.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
18. Symposium, California'sAB 1493: Trendsetting or Setting Ourselves Up to
Fail?, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 97, 129 (2002-2003).

19. Id. at 146-47.
20. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
States, Cities, Environmental Groups Sue Bush Administration on Global Warming,
Challenge EPA's Refusal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Pollution (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/octloct23a_03.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2004) [hereinafter "Press Release, States, Cities, Environmental Groups"].
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2000).
22. Press Release, States, Cities, Environmental Groups, supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, Centerfor Clean Air Policy, State and
Local Leadershipon Transportationand Climate Change (Jan. 2003). The center has
reviewed: 1) programs in Maryland, New York, and New Jersey to fund energy efficiently and limit funding to projects that do not achieve climate change goals; 2) "location efficient" initiations in Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Georgia, Illinois,
Oregon, as well as policies in thirteen different cities; and 3) programs "encouraging
environmentally friendly choices in a number of states and cities across the nation."
See also PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Activities in the United
States (June 2002) (noting that "27 states have developed or are developing strategies
of action plans to reduce net GHG emissions," and that forty states have completed or
will soon complete GHG inventories). Pew's database of state climate change initiatives currently describes forty-two case studies from twenty-seven different states
that address transportation, agriculture, energy supply, energy demand, carbon sequestration and offsets, buildings, forestry, industry, waste management, and com-
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How do states fit in to the global warming problem? Global
warming is a unique and immensely complicated problem. GHGs
that drive global warming are emitted from individual, local, natural, and human sources, and within a week they "typically are
halfway around the world, making climate change a truly global
issue." 24 Once emitted, these GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide
(CC 2 ), remain in the atmosphere trapping heat for a long time, up
to a century. The resulting warming and climate change consequences, combined with the "large heat capacity of the oceans, and
the long memory of other components of the climate system, such
as ice sheets and the biosphere ... are likely to persist for many
25
centuries in the absence of appropriate mitigation measures."
Global warming is an international climate change phenomenon
with local concerns: emissions are local, and impacts, although
driven globally by the extra energy trapped in the atmosphere, are
ultimately local. Both mitigation and adaptation must be local.
Local action will be central to possible success of any international
legal regime or policy initiative.
Often, when the world community generally recognizes an international problem, the international consensus results in a
treaty creating an international legal regime 2 6 that responds to
the problem. 27 Each nation that is party to the treaty must then
adopt domestic law to implement the legal regime within its legal
system. 28 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Framework Convention) represents such a general global
initiative. 29 It is a fundamental, although general, global agreement to limit "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
prehensive cross-sectoral activities. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, State
and Local Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Programs, at http://www.pewclimate.org/states.cfm?view=all (last visited Jan. 10, 2004); see also William Prindle et
al., American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Energy Efficiency's Next Generation: Innovation at the State Level (2003), at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e031full.
pdf.
24. Thomas R. Karl & Kevin E. Trenberth, Modern Global Climate Change, 302
SCIENCE 1719 (Dec. 5, 2003).
25. K. Hasselmann et al., The Challenge of Long Term Climate Change, 302 SciENCE 1923 (Dec. 12, 2003).
26. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 210 (3d ed.
1999).
27. See id. at 229-34.
28. Id. at 227-33.
29. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 5th Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), 31
I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force as law March 1994).
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with the climate system." 30 Because no single country caused or
can abate the momentum of rapid global warming, the Framework Convention obligates each country of the world to work towards the stabilization goal. However, the Framework
Convention is not self-enforcing; each nation must meet its obligation through its own local abatement, mitigation and adaptation
activities, or in conjunction with other nations.
As international law, the Framework Convention establishes
general goals and imposes general obligations on the parties (nations). Various nations' subsequent negotiations have led to
targets that are more concrete and timetables for reducing greenhouse gases by various nations. The centerpiece of this difficult
process is the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention, which
requires developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
five to eight percent below their 1990 levels by 2008-2012;31 negotiations are now beginning for post-2012 commitments. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, President Clinton, in 1997, agreed that the United
States would be required to reduce its GHG emissions by seven
percent by 2008-2012. However, President Bush subsequently rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2001.
However, the Kyoto Protocol has not yet entered into effect as
binding international law. By its terms, it will not enter into effect as law until it is ratified by at least fifty-five parties to the
Framework Convention, and by Framework Annex 1 nations (essentially the developed nations) that represent 55% of Annex 1
nations' 1990 GHG emissions. As of November 26, 2003, 120
countries have ratified the protocol, but the ratifying Annex 1 nations account only for 44.2% of GHG emissions. 3 2 The Protocol
can enter into effect only if either Russia (17.4%) or the U.S.
(36.1%) ratify; no other non-ratifying Annex 1 nation has a large
enough percentage to make a difference. Since the Bush Administration has rejected the Kyoto Protocol, its fate rests upon Russia. 3 3 Even if Russia were to ratify, so that the Kyoto Protocol
entered into effect as international law, the U.S. view is that it is
30. Id. at 854.
31. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/IiAdd.1, art 3.1 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
32. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol Thermometer, at http//unfccc.int/resource/kpthermo.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
33. Russia is still considering whether to ratify, but has been cryptic as to the
issues it is most concerned about. See Eric J. Lyman, Russian Statements Doubting
Kyoto's Value Dominate Talk at Global Warming Conference, 26 INT'L ENVT RPTR.
961, 966 (2003).
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not bound to the Protocol's obligations. Ironically, the delay of
Russia and the refusal of the U.S. could accelerate changes in the
34
U.N. process for setting GHG emission reduction goals.
What does all this have to do with the U.S. Constitution? At
first glance, not much. Treaties, if ratified by the Senate, are the
law of the land, binding on the states directly, if they are self executing, 3 5 or indirectly, by empowering Congress to enact implementing legislation that is binding on the states, 3 6 unless the
treaty directly violates a constitutional prohibition.3 7 But the Kyoto Protocol has not been presented to the Senate, let alone been
ratified. Moreover, it is well within the President's constitutional
foreign affairs power and treaty making power to reject a signed,
but un-ratified treaty, and to not submit it to the Senate for its
"Advice and Consent." 38 Thus, the Kyoto Protocol is not binding
upon the U.S. as a nation, nor is it part of the federal law of the
39
U.S, which controls state actions under the Supremacy Clause.
However, failure of leadership at the federal level has not
changed the reality that GHG emissions are increasing, that
global temperatures are rising, and that many Americans are concerned enough about this problem to want to take some action. As
a result, in the absence of federal leadership, many states and local governments have adopted laws to regulate GHG emissions at
the state and local level. But, constitutionally, can the states regulate GHG emissions when the President has rejected the Kyoto
Protocol because in his view it is harmful to the economic interests
of the U.S.? This paper will explore that question by examining
several constitutional doctrines that limit state activities within
our federal system, preemption, Foreign Affairs, and the dormant
commerce clause, to see if they might be applicable in this context.
In other words, is it constitutional for states to worry internationally, but respond locally?

34.
35.
36.
37.
confer

Id. at 965.
See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341-44 (1924).
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("no agreement with a foreign nation can
power on the Congress, or any other branch of Government, which is free from

the restraints of the Constitution.").
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have the Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ....
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
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The Basics of Global Warming
The earth is warmed, and made livable, by the presence of
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous
40
oxide, in the atmosphere that trap some of the heat of the sun.
The greater the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere, the
warmer the planet will be. Thus, Venus, with an intense GHG
concentration, is hot enough to melt lead. The lower the concentration, the cooler the planet-hence Mars and the moon, with
scant or no atmospheres, are frigid. Over the scope of human history, the earth's GHG has been relatively stable. However, since
the rise of the industrial revolution the concentration has risen
rapidly, primarily due to anthropogenic activities. This rise in
GHG concentration will trap more heat in the atmosphere, which
will change the earth's climate.
Both the rate and quantity of the GHG concentration are important. To put the changes in context, the rise of GHG concentrations in the last 150 years has interfered with the atmosphere's
energy flow, trapping about one percent more energy than
before. 4 1 If the associated climate change were to occur over hundreds of thousands or millions of years, as has been true in the
distant past, the effects would be invisible to human society and
the earth's ecosystem-both would easily adapt at that pace of
change. However, the GHG increases, and associated temperature increases, will both occur rapidly (almost instantaneously)
with the context of human existence and ecosystem adaptation
rates, and will "far exceed [] the natural climate . . . variability
'42
experienced in the past 10,000 years.
For purpose of this article, it is not necessary to review the
extensive science of climate change. That is readily available elsewhere. 43 What is important is to understand that greenhouse gas
40. Karl & Trenberth, supra note 24, at 1719 ("Planet Earth is habitable because
of its location relative to the sun and because of the natural greenhouse effect of its
atmosphere."). Each day, on average, the sun sends about 175 petawatts (PW, or 175
quadrillion watts) to the earth. About 31% is reflected back into space, and the rest of
the energy is absorbed by the atmosphere (about 120 PW). Id. at 1719-20.
41. Id. This one percent change in energy flow "dominates all other direct influences humans have on climate." One percent more energy in the atmosphere is about
1.2 PW. One PW "isequivalent to [the energy output] of a million power stations of
1000-MW capacity.... Total human energy use is about a factor of 9000 less than the
natural flow." Id. at 1720. Thus, cumulative human GHG emissions are trapping

about ninety times more energy in the atmosphere than we actually use in a year. Id.
42. Hasselmann, supra note 25, at 1923.
43. See generally, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al., eds. 2001), available at
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concentrations for the three major GHGs, carbon dioxide (C0 2),

methane (CH 4 ), and nitrous oxide (N20), have increased substantially since 1850. 4 4 These increases are primarily the result of

human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels such as petroleum, oil and natural gas (C0 2), cultivating rice in paddies, main-

taining herds of cattle and dairy cows, coal mining and natural
gas transportation (CH 4), and tilling and fertilizing soils to grow
crops (N 20).

45

These human-caused increases have caused global

temperatures to rise by 0.60 C ± 0.2' C since the late nineteenth
century. 46 Both the GHG increases and temperature increases
contain the human fingerprint as the culprit. 47 The predictions
that the earth will experience increased warming from existing
emissions and future emissions is estimated to increase by 2100 to
1.4' to 5.8' C from 1990 temperatures, depending on the emissions

scenario the world follows 48 and assuming no large-scale singularities (nonlinear responses due to unanticipated feedback loops)
that could trigger runaway warming or other catastrophic
49
problems.
The range and intensity of the potential consequences to
human society and the world's ecosystems is both broad and great.
Although computer models are unable to narrow the predictions to
small areas or regions, they do broadly project the dangers inherent in the warming trend. 50 Within the U.S. these consequences
can be translated into concerns specific to individual states.
Coastal states face rising sea levels (about two meters by 2100),
increased storms, and increased salinity of rivers, estuaries, and
related ground water. 51 Mountain snowcaps, glaciers and sea ice
will shrink or disappear, slowing ocean currents, adversely affecting forestry, agriculture, fresh water supply, and maritime rehttp://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl/index.htm
inafter CLIMATE CHANGE].

(last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [here-

44. C0 2 has risen about 31% from stable pre-industrial (around 1750) levels,
methane (CH 4 ) has risen about 151%, and Nitrous Oxide (N20) has risen 15%. Carbon dioxide concentrations continue to increase at 1.5 ppb, methane at 7 ppb/year,
and N 20 at 0.8 ppb/year. Id. at 6-7, 92-93.
45. Id. at 5-7.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 5, 60, 728.
48. Id. at 69.
49. Id.
50. Scientists now use improved supercomputer technology in global climate modeling, and ever-increasing improvements in the climate models, will soon produce
more detailed predictions, as well as a better sense of the possibility of catastrophic
consequences. CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 43, at 473-76.
51. Id. at 74-75.
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sources. 5 2 Increased disease from heat stress and reappearance of
disease vectors, e.g., malaria carrying mosquitoes) will burden
states' public health resources. 53 Precipitation changes will cause
increased flooding, more profound droughts, and the more frequent occurrence, with greater intensity, of extreme weather
events, such as droughts. 54 The Bush Administration appears unconcerned about these risks, having rejected the Kyoto Protocol,
and having refused to offer any alternative.
State Responses to the Risks of Global Warming
Many States, which had made modest efforts to address local
concerns about climate change, have now been much more active.
Early state regulatory responses to climate change appeared in
the late 1980s, as various state public service commissions began
to consider the idea of including external environmental costs 5 5 in
choosing among various alternatives for new electric power supply.56 By the mid-1990s about half the states, through their public service commissions, had adopted regulatory mechanisms to
evaluate proposed projects' total environmental costs, including
costs associated with the climate change effects of the proposed
plants. 5 7 This decision-making tool was developed as an attempt
to identify the long term, "least cost" option to the states' citizens.
By including a dollar value for harm the residual emissions would
produce (i.e., those emissions the plants released after complying
with all applicable environmental laws), the regulatory commissions were seeking to internalize the environmental externalities
of power production into economic decision-making. States based

52. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 7-17, 28-61 (J.J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001),
available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/index.htm.
53. Id. at 12, 451-78, 570.
54. CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 43, at 92.
55. An environmentally costed project would include both the project's traditional
financial cost and the monetary value of the harm the emissions of the plant would
impose on society.
56. For an early example of the advocacy of his approach, see Ralph C. Cavanagh,

Least Cost PlanningImperatives For Electric Utilitiesand Their Regulators, 10 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 299 (1986).
57. ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
EXTERNALITIES: CASE STUDIES (1995), available at http://wwweia.doc.gov/cneaflelectricity/etternal/external.pdf.
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major investments on the "true" short- and long-term costs of the
power project. 58
The emission of C0 2, the principle GHG, creates a significant

externality which economic theory requires be internalized. However, CO 2 does not directly cause environmental and human
health problems, it only traps more heat in the atmosphere. As a
result, many state Public Service Commissions (PSCs) turned to
proxies to establish an externality value for greenhouse gases. 59
Those persons opposed to using this decision-making device argued that it was beyond the jurisdiction of PSC's because it was
akin to environmental regulation, 60 which was the job of EPA (at
the federal level) and state environmental agencies, and also was
bad policy. 61 Those behind this policy tool responded that it was
just sound economic regulation for the public good-the central
mission of utility regulation. There are several reasons to consider the full environmentally priced cost of power plants. 62 First,
internalizing externalities conforms to standard economic theory.
As the externalities become significant, it is society that pays the
costs by absorbing the damage, which amounts to an unwarranted
subsidy of polluting plants. Second, since new power plants are
major capital commitments, that will last at least forty to fifty
years, failure to anticipate the possibility of future regulation of
the residual emissions, and the potential costs associated with
58. For a more detailed analysis of this idea in the context of federalism, see Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999).
59. See, e.g., In Re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 150 P.U.R.4th 130 (Minn. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1994); In Re Calculation and Use of Cost-effectiveness Levels for Conservation, 152 P.U.R.4th 58 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994) (publication pages not
available) (noting that "costs related to ...carbon dioxide are likely to be internalized
in some form within the 20 year planning horizon."); In Re Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp.,
No. 5624, 1994 WL 400909, *7 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1994) (requiring the addition
of a 5% allowance to base costs for "external costs of producing that energy, such as
contributions to . ..global warming."); In Re Mont. Power Co., 152 P.U.R.4th 403
(Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1994) (publication pages not available) (ordering the utility
"to include cost estimates for externalities in its next rate filing ... although such
estimates are uncertain it is inappropriate to continue to design rates under the assumption that the value for externalities is zero. At a minimum the utility must estimate damage costs associated with carbon dioxide," and other pollutants to "reflect
impacts on human health, agriculture, timber, livestock, ecosystems and biodiversity,
global climate, recreation, visual and audio aesthetics, and land use (including property values).").
60. See, e.g., Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1994).
61. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and CentralPlanningin Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, COLUM. L. REV.
1339 (1993).
62. See Hodas, supra note 6.
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complying with the new regulations, would be unsound economic
decision-making.
State courts that reviewed challenges to these regulations
have generally upheld the idea that the consideration of environmental externalities is a proper economic regulatory exercise of
PSC.63 To the extent that state courts restricted the power of the
PSC to consider externalities, that restriction applied only to pollutants already regulated by state and federal environmental
agencies. 6 4 However, under that approach, greenhouse gases such
as CO 2, which are entirely unregulated, could be evaluated for
their environmental externalities, particularly if the PSC found
65
that there was a significant risk of future regulation of that gas.
Although many states and local governments have explored,
66
and even adopted, measures to control GHG for sometime now,
the election of President George W. Bush, and his rapid policy
shift to reject the Kyoto Protocol, has accelerated state and local
measures. Frustration with the Bush Administration's failure to
propose an alternative to Kyoto has been a major impetus behind
recent state efforts. However, it is not the sole factor. Many
states see some kind of GHG regulation to be inevitable. Some
seek to engage in early, low cost measures that will give them a
competitive advantage when the game begins. Others are experimenting with alternative policy approaches to see what does and
does not work in their area.
The list of state and local laws addressing global warming is
very long and growing rapidly. Some are comprehensive while
others are sector-driven. Some are regulatory, others voluntary or
market based; some seek to control GHG emissions, others seek to
63. See, e.g., In the Matter of Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
64. Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1033-34 (Mass. 1994).
Specifically, the court held that although the Massachusetts D.P.U. lacks the power
"to consider the overall impact of pollution on society," the D.P.U.
[MIay direct the avoidance of conditions that a utility might experience,
provided that reasonably anticipated future circumstances will impose
costs on the utility .... [Ihf it reasonably appears that the current emission of a pollutant in lawful amounts will be affected in the foreseeable
future by a prohibition, new restriction, costly regulation, or pollution
penalties or taxes, for example, the department has the authority as a
rate regulator to consider the appropriateness of avoiding that reasonably
foreseeable change and requiring that the utility pursue a course likely to
be less costly to the ratepayers in the long term.
Id.
65. Id.
66. See Dernbach, supra note 5.
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promote carbon sinks. Some are regional, even international in
scope, while others are local. Even within particular approaches,
there is much variety. For instance, some economics-based approaches anticipate emissions credits and market trading, others
look to taxes and pricing mechanisms to change consumer behavior, and others look to supplant electricity regulation with market
oriented performance standards such as renewable portfolio standards, environmentally costed integrated resource planning, and
environmental system benefits charges. Obviously, this article is
67
not the place to evaluate the particulars of these approaches.
Rather, this article will consider on a more general level whether
these, or other, efforts by states to act locally on the global warming problem offend federalism conceptions of the constitution, particularly the foreign affairs power of the national government.
Under the Constitution, a federal government of limited powers rules us: Congress may only enact legislation within one of the
areas of power granted to it.68 In contrast, the several states that
comprise our country possess, under the Constitution of 1787,69
full, unbridled police power, or what James Madison called "the
numerous and indefinite"70 power of the states, that is presumptively plenary, subject only to the states' own constitutions and
specific limitations in the U.S. Constitution. 7 1 Thus, under the
Constitution of 1787, a state could enact any law it wished, except
for a small variety of laws specifically prohibited by the constitution, such as laws regulating interstate and foreign trade, 72 state
treaties with other countries, 73 and ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder;7 4 nor could a state deny a citizen of another state the
75
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the state's own citizens.
67. For a proposed analytic model to evaluate state law developments, see Kosloff
& Trexler, supra note 4.
68. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Under the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights, these powers were essentially those enumerated in
Article 1, section I, clause 18 (or those that were "necessary and proper" to effect an
enumerated end).
69. Any particular state may, under its state constitution, limit the scope of that
state's police power. Such a limitation would be an artifact of state law, rather than a
diminishment of power mandated by the U.S. Constitution.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 137 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1986).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
72. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
74. Id.

75. Id. art. IV, § 2.
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Moreover, the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, and so it
76
was not a constitutional restriction on state law.
This allocation of and limitation on power changed drastically
as a result of the Civil War. The Civil War answered the question
as to whether states could voluntarily secede from the Union: they
cannot. It also resulted in states being subject to federal constitutional limitations designed to protect individual liberties. 7 7 It was
initially thought that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject
states to the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. 78 However, in the
late nineteenth century the Supreme Court's campaign to protect
"economic rights" from interference by states led it to reverse its
long-standing rule that the Bill of Rights did not limit state action
by applying the Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause to
state law. 7 9 Thus began the Court's controversial exploration of
which rights in the first eight amendments should be "incorporated" into the meaning of "liberty" in due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.8 0 As a result, the previously relatively
unbridled state police power is now subject to a wide array of
prohibitions designed to enhance personal liberty and reduce the
power of states to act arbitrarily with respect to individual
rights.8 1
Defining the scope of federal legislative power, and prohibitions on the use of that power, of the United States and the several states is only the beginning of our analysis of whether state
laws affecting GHG emissions are constitutional. Where valid
federal law and state law conflict, the Constitution declares the
rule, which shall be obeyed by all judges, that the federal law is
the "supreme law of the land" despite any state law to the contrary.8 2 Thus, absent a conflict between federal and state law, or
76. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 332 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's taking clause did not apply to
state actions: "the Uust compensation] provision of the fifth amendment . . . is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.").
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibition of slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV

(due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses); U.S. CONST.
amend. XV (prohibiting states from denying voting rights on the basis of race, color or
previous condition of servitude).
78. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
79. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
80. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 433-50
(14th ed. 2001).
81. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § I, cl. 2.
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a state law that violates one of the limited set of constitutional
prohibitions, states faced no other explicit federal constitutional
constraint.
However, state power has also been constrained by judicially
articulated federalism doctrines derived from the structure of the
Constitution, not its explicit language. From the Supremacy
Clause comes the preemption doctrine, which preempts state laws
that Congress expressly preempts, when federal law occupies the
field, or where the law, generally or as applied, obstructs a federal
law from achieving its purpose.8 3 Another judicially announced
federalism limitation on state power has been derived from the
Commerce Clause. Known as the dormant commerce clause, this
doctrine bars any otherwise valid state laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce or unduly burden interstate commerce.8 4 Much has already been written generally about preemption and the dormant commerce clause, and specifically about the
application of preemption 8 5 and the dormant commerce clause8 6 to
state laws regulating GHG and other air pollutants. This article
will not reiterate what has already been said, but will merely apply the doctrines to the field of state and local GHG laws.
A third federalism limit on state power is the foreign affairs
power, which resides in the President's fundamental executive
powers, 8 7 as well as in certain powers granted to Congress, such
as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to declare
war, raise and maintain military forces, ratify treaties and approve international agreements, establish rules for immigration
and naturalization, fund foreign aid programs, and to participate
in international institutions such as the United Nations, the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the North

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
83. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
84. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California'sAuthority to Regulate Mobile
Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699 (2003).

86. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 58.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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American Treaty Organization (NATO). 8 8 The foreign affairs
powers of the federal government have received considerably less
analytic attention than federalism generally, and almost no attention in the context of GHGs, or international environmental law.
In the context of GHG regulations to stem global warming, where
states are thinking globally, but acting locally, we must consider
whether federal law preempts these efforts, violates the dormant
commerce clause, or unconstitutionally limits the foreign affairs
power of the President.
One of the great constitutional questions debated today is
what the relative power of the federal government and of the several states should be. The tension between the federal govern89
ment and the states has been central to our nation's history.
The necessity of a national government led to the abandonment of
the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of our Constitution,
which established a national government of limited powers, reserving to the States all their police powers not given away or prohibited in establishing the federal government. 90 Although a
government of limited powers, the federal law was established to
be supreme law of the land where those powers were properly exercised. 9 1 However, during the last decade the definition of the
federal government's enumerated powers has been subjected to judicially declared "federalism" limitations. For instance, the Court
has held that the inherent federalism structure of the Constitution prohibits Congress from "commandeering" the executive or
legislative branches of state government to achieve federal
goals, 92 and limits Congress' power to allow citizens to sue states
93
for violations of federal law.
From an environmental law perspective this structure was
not problematic, since in the 1970's, when most of the modern environmental law statutes were enacted, the commerce clause was
88. Id. at art. I, § 8; see generally Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
89. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (describing federalism as
possibly the "oldest question of constitutional law.").
90. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
91. Id. at 405 ("The nation on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily
bind its component parts."); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
92. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 14 (1992); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), with Nat'l League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
93. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001).
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so broadly interpreted that the environmental laws easily fit, 9 4
and the statutes reflected a new conception, cooperative federalism, which avoided federalism and Eleventh Amendment (state
sovereignty) concerns. 95 Nor did these statutes impede state efforts to protect their environment since Congress generally allowed states to enact more stringent requirements than the
minimum national standards the federal laws imposed. 9 6
However, the federalism superstructure upon which the federal environmental laws were built has undergone significant
modification in recent years. The post New Deal conception of a
broadly conceived Commerce Clause, and the great deference of
the Supreme Court towards congressional findings, no longer exists. 97 Not only has the Court become more circumspect about the
scope of legislative power Congress has under the Commerce
Clause, it has also limited Congress' power on the basis of new
articulations of federalism that derive, so the Court says, from the
basic constitutional structural relationship between the national
government and the sovereign power of the states. In this view,
the Tenth Amendment is no longer merely a truism, but is a metaphor for some essential state sovereignty that federal power cannot limit. 98
In the current Court's view, a federalism doctrine that bolsters the relative power of the states and protects the dignity of
state sovereignty is essential. 99 According to Justice Kennedy, in
creating our federalist system, the nation's founders "split the
atom of sovereignty." 10 0 In these Justices' view, federalism is a
94. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClurg, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Recent Supreme Court
Commerce Clause decisions do not appear to change this view substantially. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); but cf. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000) (the Clean Air Act section creating state
implementation plans as the primary vehicle for implementing national ambient air
quality standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000) (the Clean Water Act states that it is
the "policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution ....); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (requires state water quality certification for federal water discharge permits);
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (allows state Clean Water Act permit programs).
96. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370.
97. The implication of Commerce Clause jurisprudence on federal environmental
laws are addressed in depth by Bradley Bobertz's article in this symposium edition.
98. See United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S.
898 (1997).
99. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
100. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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fundamental structural support of our democratic republic. Federalism, as articulated by the current Court's majority, preserves
an important role for states to prevent tyranny, 10 1 preserves a
level of government that is (in theory, at least) more sensitive and
accountable to the needs of its citizens, and promotes vital innovation and experimentation. 10 2 To achieve this federalism ideal, the
Court must carefully circumscribe and examine Congress' use of
03
its legislative power.'
This revived federalism doctrine has been used to limit the
power of the federal government by limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause, expanding the Tenth Amendment to be an affirmative limit on federal power over state government, and by
expanding the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to protect
states from lawsuits based on federal law. 10 4 However, it is not
clear yet whether the new federalists will, and if so, how, rein in
the power of the federal government when applying other federalism related doctrines. For instance, the Court originally developed the dormant commerce clause to restrict states from
interfering with or discriminating against interstate commerce,
even where Congress was silent.' 0 5 Thus, even when Congress
had not regulated or addressed a particular interstate commerce
concern, states were restricted in the scope of their activities.
This long-standing doctrine 0 6 is consistent with the nationalist
concerns of the framers, who abandoned the Articles of Confederation in large part because of state restrictions on the free flow of
commerce.1077 However, the new federalists, who favor enhancing
the role of states in our federal system, might rule that the dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has gone too far in the direction of protecting the national government against the states,
101. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
102. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
103. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
104. See the evolution of Eleventh Amendment federalism jurisprudence in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001);
FederalMaritime Comm. v. South CarolinaState Port Authority; 535 U.S. 743 (2002);
Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
105. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
106. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
107. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 529 (1949); Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1986).
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thereby unduly burdening states' abilities to address state concerns.1 0 8 To date, however, the Court has not yet attempted to
recalibrate the dormant commerce clause to be more deferential to
state interests.
Thus, federalism limits on state GHG statutes might emerge
from the dormant commerce clause. Dormant commerce clause
concerns might be acute when states are regulating electric utilities by favoring in-state resources over out-of-state fuels,10 9 or by
discriminating against out-of-state electricity generators over instate suppliers. 11 0 However, states may legitimately use their
traditional power to regulate natural electricity monopolies without violating the dormant commerce clause, even if out-of-state
suppliers of electricity may incidentally be adversely affected. 1 '
Thus, a state may impose an externality valuation in regulating
utilities, so long as the valuation does not discriminate against
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests. 11 2 Nor may state
regulatory control of electric utilities be used to impair trading of
SO 2 emissions allowances under the Clean Air Act, even if a downwind state believes that trades by in-state utilities to utilities in
up-wind states will have a direct, adverse impact on air quality in
the down-wind state. 113 Thus, unless state statutes, regulations,
108. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 632-33 (1978). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, stated,
I do not see why a State may ban the importation of items whose movement risks contagion, but cannot ban the importation of items which, although they may be transported into the State without undue hazard,
will then simply pile up in an ever increasing danger to the public's
health and safety. The Commerce Clause was not drawn with a view to
having the validity of state laws turn on such pointless distinctions.
Id.
109. See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh, 72 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 1995). For an overview and
analysis of the constitutionality of state subsidies, see Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998).
110. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
111. See Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Penn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 711 A.2d
1071 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
112. However, in a market-based electricity system, where state regulatory incentives use sales taxes and similar economic interests, dormant commerce clause
problems may emerge. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 925 (2000) (citing Steven Ferrey, Renewable
Subsidies in the Age of Deregulation;State-imposed PreferencesMay Have Come to the
Wrong Place at the Wrong Time, FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 1997, at 22).
113. See Clean Air Act Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159-62 (N.D.
N.Y. 2002), affd, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirmed on statutory preemption
grounds without addressing dormant clause analysis). "New York's explicit restriction on the transfer of S02 allowances to units in Upwind States erects such a barrier
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or administrative orders that require consideration of GHG emissions effects (which may occur outside the states borders) in integrated resource planning and rate-making are designed to
discriminate against interstate commerce or unduly burden interstate commerce they would not appear to raise dormant commerce
114
clause questions.
The dormant commerce clause, derived from the Commerce
Clause and historic federalism imperatives when the nation was
founded, is sufficiently developed and detailed to be considered its
own doctrine. It could also be viewed, at least at a conceptual
level, to be a category of constitutional law that might be called
"federalism preemption;" i.e., the Supremacy Clause operates on
the dormant commerce clause to invalidate (preempt) state laws
that offend the dormant commerce clause. The Supremacy Clause
is the essential federalism dictate of the Constitution of 1787.115
It announces the general rule that federal law is the supreme law
of the land. 116 It is the Supremacy Clause which has always provided the rule of decision, now generally located in the preemption
doctrine, when state law and federal statutory or regulatory law
collide. 117
As a working rule, the preemption doctrine is
straightforward:
Preemption may be either expressed or implied and "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose." Absent explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field preemption, where the scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as
against the movement of interstate trade. Accordingly, [it] is a constitutionally invalid protectionist measure." 194 F. Supp. 2d at 161. The District Court also held that
even if it were nondiscriminatory, the law would place nevertheless be unconstitutional because it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. Id.
114. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 58.
115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § I, cl. 2.
116. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments add federal prohibitions on the use of state power and specifically authorize Congress to enact legislation
to enforce those prohibitions. By expanding Congress' powers to regulate State activity, these amendments represent a major change in the constitution's federalism balance between federal and state power. However, this power shift relates exclusively
to federal regulation of state power over individuals.
117. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (holding that the
state of Maryland cannot tax a branch of the second bank of the United States because "[the] great principle is, the constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective
States, and cannot be controlled by them.").
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to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it," and conflict pre-emption, where
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility," or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."1 18
However, as Gade itself teaches, application of the basic doctrine
may differ, based on the Justices' perception of Congress' objectives, the state law's purpose, and the decision making presumptions that should apply. 1 19 Gade, decided by Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White and Scalia), held that the state law was barred by conflict
preemption. Justice Kennedy, finding express preemption, concurred in part and in the judgment. In contrast, Justices Souter,
Blackman, Stevens, and Thomas dissented because the plurality
did not apply the rule "that federal pre-emption of state law is
only to be found in a clear congressional purpose to supplant exercises of the states' traditional police powers . ... "12o A particular
Justice's perception may well be influenced by federalism concerns because "[t]he more broadly the power to preempt is construed, the smaller the scope for state authority, and similarly the
more broadly statutes are construed as preemptive, the narrower
12 1
the scope of state authority.'
This leads us to the question of whether state and local legislative initiatives to address global warming are valid within our
constitutional system. The question can be analyzed at several
levels. The first is whether any of the specific state laws are preempted by federal statutes. Clearly, if a state statute conflicts
with federal statute, the state statute is preempted. So, for instance, a Massachusetts law (the so-called Burma Law) enacted to
support human rights and democracy in Burma by barring state
agencies from purchasing goods and services from Burma was unconstitutional because it conflicted with a subsequent federal statute which imposed sanctions on Burma, and authorized the
118. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (O'Connor, J.)
(citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 115 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36
TULSA L.J. 11, 13 (2000) (arguing that "[pireemption law should ...

be coordinated

with the . . . constitutional law of federalism, if the nation is to have a coherently
unified law of national and state power.").
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President to impose further sanctions. 12 2 The Massachusetts law,
more stringent and rigid than Congress' enactment, was "an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's [sic] full objectives
under the federal Act."12 3
At present there is no federal statute that directly regulates
greenhouse gas emissions, so, statutorily, there can be no express
preemption. Moreover, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) recently announced that it does not have authority under
the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant
for which it would be obligated to establish a national ambient air
quality standard. 24 Thus, in terms of ambient air quality, it appears that the federal government has abandoned the field to the
states. Moreover, even if EPA were to designate carbon dioxide to
be a criteria pollutant, and were to promulgate national ambient
air quality standards for carbon dioxide, that would not preclude a
state from adopting and implementing a more stringent standard
25
for that pollutant.
Although EPA does not appear interested in regulating carbon dioxide as a pollutant from motor vehicle emissions, the Clean
Air Act generally prohibits states from setting mobile source emission limitations under the Clean Air Act,' 2 6 except for the California car.' 27 The Clean Air Act allows only two varieties of motor
vehicle emission limitations, the so-called national car, and the
California car. 128 Thus, to the extent that a particular state GHG
statute is deemed to regulate motor vehicle emissions in a manner
inconsistent with the California car preemption waiver it might
conflict with the Clean Air Act's two car mandate. For instance,
122. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
123. Id. at 364-380. Specifically, the court held that the
[S]tatute conflicts with federal law... by penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted or excluded from sanctions...
[even though] there is no real conflict between the statutes because they
share the same goals and because some companies may comply with both
sets of restrictions .... The state Act is at odds with the President's intended authority to speak for the United States among the World's nations in developing a "comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring
democracy to and improve human rights practices [in] Burma."
Id.
124. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 FR 52,922, 52,925-931 (Monday, Sept. 8, 2003).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation, 79 F.3d 1298 (2d Cir. 1996).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543.
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California has recently enacted a statute limiting future greenhouse gas emissions, which might be deemed an effort to regulate
motor vehicle emissions beyond what EPA currently allows under
its approved version of the California car. However, should California petition EPA to approve a new version of the California car,
which incorporates reduced carbon dioxide emissions, EPA might
be obligated to approve the application, thereby waiving any
12 9
Clean Air Act preemption.
Foreign Affairs
We turn now to consider whether state and local laws addressing global warming and greenhouse gases offend the Constitution by intruding on the foreign affairs power of the federal
government. Certainly, duly ratified treaties and the federal statutes that implement them are the supreme law of the land. As
130
such, they preempt conflicting state laws.
Nor does the Tenth Amendment provide refuge for a state.
For instance, in Missouri v. Holland,1 31 a Missouri game warden
sued the United States to enjoin enforcement of the federal Bird
Treaty Act of 1918, which had to be enacted into law to meet the
United States promises under the Migratory Bird Treaty of
1918.132 Missouri argued that the "statute is an unconstitutional
interference with the rights reserved to the States under the
Tenth Amendment," 133 namely Missouri's traditional police power
to regulate hunting of wild animals in the state. Justice Holmes
presented the federalism questions and how to decide it:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent
act, like the Constitution . . . we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It
was enough for them to realize and hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.
The case before us must be considered in light of our whole ex129. See Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California'sAuthority To Regulate Mobile Source
Greenhouse Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699 (2003) (arguing that California is not preempted by either the Clean Air Act or the CAFE statute in implementing
its carbon dioxide emission reduction statute, AB 1493).
130. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483 (1879); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
131. 252 U.S. 416.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 431.
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perience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred
years ago. The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiationfrom
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider
what that nation has become in deciding what that Amendment
1 34
has reserved.
Justice Holmes then held that the treaty and statute preempt the
state's police power to regulate hunting within the state. As to the
Tenth Amendment, the Court dismissed Missouri's claim that it
owned these wild, migratory birds (at least while they were in
Missouri) or that the Tenth Amendment protected its putative
ownership. 135
Holmes articulated the relationship between national and
state interests:
We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of
our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to
rely on the States. The reliance is in vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to
act. We are of the opinion that the treaty and statute must be
upheld.136
Thus, the Tenth Amendment provides no federalism limit on the
treaty power, even though, "no agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Gov137
ernment, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."
Presumably, the Court was here referring to protections of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 138 Justice Black
134. Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
135. 'Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the begin-

ning of ownership. The whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within
their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another

state and in a week a thousand miles away." Id. at 434.
136. Id. at 435.
137. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
138. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2388 n.9 (2003).
Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law,

just as treaties are .... Subject, that is, to the Constitution's guarantees
of individual rights. Even Justice Sutherland's reading of the National
Government's "inherent" foreign affairs power ... contained the caveat
that the power, "like every other governmental power, must be exercised
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."
Id. (citations omitted).
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later explicitly confirmed Justice Holmes' view that the Tenth
139
Amendment provides no such constraints:
[In Missouri v. Holland] the Court carefully noted that the
treaty involved was not inconsistent with any specific provision
of the Constitution. The Court was concerned with the Tenth
Amendment which reserves to the States or the people all power
not delegated to the National Government. To the extent that
the United States can validly make treaties, the people and the
National Government
States have delegated their power to the 140
barrier.
no
is
Amendment
Tenth
the
and
Thus, the Tenth Amendment cannot be used generally to limit
federal treaty power over states,' 4 1 although it certainly protects
state use of police power in the absence of a constitutional prohibition or preemption.
The final question to examine is whether the various state
GHG laws and initiatives offend the Foreign Affairs powers of the
President or Congress under the Constitution because they reflect
a state response to an international problem that offends the federalism balance of powers that the Framers' built into the Constitution. Although the Court has had the opportunity to answer
this question, it has declined to do so. Instead, it appears to be
developing a doctrine of foreign affairs preemption, although the
specifics of the doctrine, the boundaries of its coverage, and even
its existence are uncertain.14 2 This issue has not been directly ad139. Covert, 354 U.S. 1. Picking up on the new federalism approach of the current
Supreme Court, one commentator has argued for abandoning the Missouri v. Holland
approach to treaties and federalism in favor of applying the same federalism constraints Congress is limited by to treaties. See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998). This argument has received a
rocky reception. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty
Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003); David M. Golove, Treaty Making and the
Nation: The HistoricalFoundationsof the NationalistConception of the Treaty Power,
98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
140. Covert, 354 U.S. at 18.
141. However, it is an open question whether the Tenth Amendment might bar
Congress from choosing to implement a national treaty obligation by commanding
states to promulgate and enforce statutes and regulations, or otherwise "commandeering" branched of state government. See Janet R. Carter, Note, Commandeering
Under the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 598 (2001). However, this concern has not
arisen in the past because Congress historically has "given or left to the States a
substantial part in the implementation of national foreign policy." Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 245 (1972).
142. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2389, 2400 (2003). Compare Justice Souter for the majority, "[ilt is a fair question whether respect for the
executive foreign relations power requires a categorical choice between the contrast-
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dressed by the Supreme Court in the few foreign affairs federalism cases it has considered. Most foreign affairs cases considered
the issues through the lens of separation of powers among the
three branches of the federal government. Even then, the Court
has tended to not resolve the constitutional issue by deeming it to
be a political question, better resolved by Congress and the
14 3
President.

ing theories of field and conflict preemption.., but the question requires no answer
here[,]" with Justice Ginsburg, dissenting,
[Wie would reserve foreign affairs preemption for circumstances where
the President, acting under statutory or constitutional authority, has spoken clearly to the issue at hand. "[Tihe Framers did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government." And judges should not be the
expositors of the Nation's foreign policy, which is the role they play by
acting when the President himself has not taken a clear stand. As I see
it, courts step out of their proper role when they rely on no legislative or
even executive text, but only on inference and implication, to preempt
state laws on foreign affairs grounds.
Id. at 2389, 2400 (citations omitted). For more detailed analysis of the confusion in
this area, see The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226,
235 (2003) (arguing that the dormant foreign affairs preemption concept is incoherent
and deserves "burial"); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism:State Bargaining
and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DuKE L.J. 1127 (2000); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1989).
143. The Supreme Court has a long history of ruling that matters related to foreign
affairs are nonjusticiable political questions, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297 (1918), although the Court has ruled on the merits with respect to whether
the President has the power to enter into executive agreements instead of treaties.
See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); and as to whether the subject
matter of a treaty is constitutional, see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has held to be political questions disputes about:
a) when a "war" begins or ends, a power vested exclusively in Congress in Commercial
Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923); b) recognition of foreign governments or
Indian tribes in United States v. Blemont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913); and c) the validity, ratification, and interpretation of treaties in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, federal courts have
applied the reasoning behind these rulings to find that disputes over the President's
exercise of war powers are political questions. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (challenge to Vietnam
War); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251
(1984) (challenge to President's use of the military in El Salvador); Ange v. Bush, 752
F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (challenge to the first Iraq war). The application of the
political question doctrine has been the subject of vigorous scholarly debate. See, e.g.,
Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031
(1985); Louis Henkin, Vietnam in the Courts of the United States: PoliticalQuestions,
63 AM. J. INT'L L. 284 (1969).
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Conclusion
Generally, from a federalism perspective, it is hard to imagine
any argument that state and local GHG initiatives are constitutionally offensive. They do not conflict with any federal statutes
or regulations. They do not conflict with any treaty or executive
agreement, they do not they impose any obligation, limitation, or
condition on an foreign government, nor do they interfere with
federal settlement of disputes and claims against foreign countries or businesses. Thus, no matter what theory of preemption is
operative, be it traditional preemption, 144 dormant foreign affairs
preemption, 145 or the recently proposed (and very attractive) approach of dormant Treaty Clause preemption, 146 there is simply
no federalism concern here. Instead, each state GHG legal initiative is directed solely at local activities that result in the mitigation of GHG emissions. The state and local activities represent
exactly the kind of activities that states should be encouraged to
institute, when the federal government is not active. 147 Moreover,
from the federal government's perspective, these state and local
policies are not only objectionable, they are essential:
State-level policies to control greenhouse gas emissions are essential for mitigating the economic, health and environmental
treats posed be global climate change. States play a crucial role
144. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
145. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 135 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
146. Swaine, supra note 142, at 1128 (arguing that judicial application of preemption in the field of foreign affairs should be based exclusively on the Treaty Clause).
147. See Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National
Perspective on the Benefit of State Participation,46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1028 (2001).
Mr. Halberstam argues that:
[A]lthough tensions between federal and state policies do emerge periodically, state activities often benefit the Nation. State officials are frequently in a better position to promote trade and investment
opportunities at home. Relative to federal actors, state officials may enjoy an informational advantage relevant to the crafting or carrying out
international agreements. State officials may assist national policymakers by providing broad political support that differs from the support garnered by organized economic interests. And independent state action
may induce federal officials to take up international issues that would
otherwise not make it onto their political agenda. Indeed, the federal government has frequently embraced the state and local concerns as its own
and, especially in the area of trade and investment, has regularly included state and local governmental representative in the formulation of
federal foreign policy itself.
Id. at 1028.
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in helping the US as a whole to meet the national pledge to re148
duce greenhouse gas emissions.

The states are policy development laboratories. They are innovators, and they are taking direct political responsibility for
their innovations. According to Washington State Governor Gary
Locke, "The states are taking action for one simple reason: because the federal government is not."' 49 State initiatives represent local political actions designed, in part, to push global
warming onto the national agenda, 150 even though it is universally recognized that uncoordinated state and local efforts can
only be a weak stand-in for federal leadership and action in the
realm of climate change.
Ironically, the federal government responded to the "withering" international criticism of its failure to act on global warming,
by declaring that the multitude of state and local initiatives
demonstrate that "there is a broad effort going on in the United
States on many levels to address global climate change."' 5 1 In the
Administration's chief negotiator's view, the states were "laboratories where new and creative ideas and methods can be applied
and shared with others and inform federal policy, a truly bottom148. ENVTL. PROT.AGENCY, STATES GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: POLICY PLANNING TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 1-1 (2d ed., 1998), available at http://yosemite.epa.

gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ResourceCenterPublicationsReferenceStateGuidanceDocument.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
149. Andrew C. Revkin & Jennifer 8. [sic] Lee, White House Attacked for Letting
States Lead on Climate Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A32 [hereinafter Climate
Policy].
150. Id. A senior aid to New York Gov. George E. Pataki stated, "They [the Bush
Administration] have not yet taken climate change on as a real issue and developed
policies. We are going to keep pushing them." Id.
151. Climate Policy, supra note 149 (quoting Dr. Harlan L. Watson, the Bush Administration's chief negotiator at the Milan Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in December 2003). The
EPA's global warming website takes a similar approach. On its website, EPA touts a
range of state activities as important policy initiatives: "Action at the state level is a
key component of the US response to the potential impacts posed by climate change."
See http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsState.html
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2004). The site reviews twenty-eight state plans, many case studies,
and legislative efforts across the nation. As to local initiatives, EPA's position is that:
Cities and towns across the U.S. are on the front lines of climate change
and feel the effects of changes such as in precipitation, temperature, sealevel rise, and air quality. Cities and towns are also in the position to take
a variety of energy efficiency and renewable energy actions that can have
multiple benefits including saving money, creating jobs, promoting sustainable growth, and reducing criteria pollutants.
See http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsLocal.html
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2004).
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up approach to addressing climate change," which both federal officials and industry groups believe "is in the best federalist tradition." 152 Although some people criticize the Administration for
hiding behind state actions to mollify international critics of federal hostility towards global warming policy, at least the Administration's federalism approach supports existing, and encourages
future, state and local innovations. The Administration does not
view the state efforts as contrary to the national interest, but, indeed, to be in the nation's interest. So, from all constitutional perspectives, it is constitutional for states to react to risks of global
warming, or to think globally but act locally.

152. Climate Policy, supra note 149.
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